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Abstract 
We offer an empirical analysis of the effects of health shocks on debt holdings of older 
Americans using panel data from the Health and Retirement Study. The average older 
American household owes a surprisingly large amount of mortgage and consumer debt, 
even in their late seventies. The occurrence of a severe health shock, such as the diagnosis 
of heart problems, cancer or a stroke, will increase mortgage and consumer debt if a 
household does not currently have debt, but results in less debt held if the household is 
already borrowing. If a household has only government insurance then the onset of a 
sudden severe health problem will increase debt but by less than if the household had only 
private insurance. If the government wishes to reduce debt owed by older Americans one 
approach it should consider seriously is the displacement of private insurance by 
government insurance. 
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Introduction 
 
Older households are becoming an ever increasing proportion of the population in most 
western economies. The US Census Bureau predicts that the share of the US population 
aged 65 years or over will rise from 12.97% in 2010 to 19.30% in 2030 and that by 2036 
one in every five Americans will be aged 65 years or over (US Census Bureau). Eurostat 
(2008) predicts that the percentage of the population in the EU 27 countries that is aged 
65 years and over will rise from 17.1% in 2008 to 25.4% in 2030. The method of funding 
the increasing costs of healthcare, particularly in the US, remains the subject of national 
debate1. Since the average annual expenditure on health care for those aged over 65 years 
is considerably above that for younger people (Seshamani and Gray: 2004) the funding of 
health care for this age group is a major concern. Many sources of funds may be used by 
older Americans including using government insurance, private insurance or self payment 
which may include taking out loans. Yet whilst there is a growing literature concerned 
with the asset portfolios of the elderly, often with specific emphasis on housing wealth 
(Venti and Wise 1989, 1990, 2004), Shiener and Weil 1993, Hurd (1999), Coile and 
Milligan 2006), Yogo (2008)), very few studies indeed have considered the debt holdings 
of older people and in particular how these are impacted by the occurrence of health 
shocks. The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of health shocks on the amount of 
debt owed by older American households. If health shocks result in higher debt levels as 
older Americans struggle to pay their medical bills, then with an unchanged2 Medicare 
unlikely to be made more generous, certain social policy implications follow.  
 
Bucks et al used data from the US Survey of Finance  reported that between 2004 and 
2007 the percentage of those aged 55-64 and 65-74 that owed any debt rose from  76.3 % 
and 58.5% to 81.8% and 65.5% respectively (Bucks et al 2008). Souleles and Sinai (2007) 
used the 1989 to 2002 waves of the Survey of Consumer Finance to conclude that rises in 
house prices have lead to equity withdrawal. But they do not consider other types of debt 
and the sample sizes for elderly households are relatively small. Lee et al (2007) used the 
2000 wave of the HRS to predict whether a household possesses debt and conclude that 
                                                 
1 See BBC news website: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/8160058.stm 
2 Medicare is unlikely to give greater benefits since  its  expenditures  are predicted to rise from 2.7% of 
GDP in 2005 to 7.3% in 2035 (Board of Trustees: 2006) 
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health status, income, net worth, marital status, race, employment status and housing 
tenure affect whether or not mortgage or consumer debt is held. But this study does not 
explain the size of debt holdings. Neither study includes an analysis of the dynamics of 
debt holdings for individual households. So they cannot, for example, observe how, if a 
shock affects a household’s financial position, that household reacts in terms of its 
holdings of debt. Recent changes in credit markets suggest that this is important. Nor do 
the papers consider possible cohort effects. The aim of our paper is to use the advantages 
of a panel dataset that is specifically designed to capture this type of information from 
exclusively elderly households. By doing this we can examine changes over time.  
 
We find that surprisingly large amounts of debt are held by Americans aged over 65 
years. The occurrence of a severe health shock, such as the diagnosis of heart problems, 
cancer or a stroke will increase total, mortgage and consumer debt if the household does 
not have debt already yet may result in a decrease in debt held if a household already 
owes money. If a household prefers only one form of insurance then our results suggest 
that holding only government insurance would probably result in a smaller increase in 
debt following a health shock than relying solely on private insurance. 
 
Following this Introduction we briefly review the theoretical analysis of the holding of 
debt in the presence of health shocks and then explain our estimation strategy. The 
following sections show our results concerning the effects of age and more importantly 
health shocks on debt holdings. We then subject our findings to various robustness tests 
and subsequently consider the separate effects of the possession of government and 
private health insurance on debt. The last section concludes. 
 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
 
The observed volume of debt held by an individual depends on demand and supply 
factors. The standard theory of demand is based on the PIH. This assumes that each point 
in time, t, an individual chooses his consumption to maximise the expected present value 
of his utility, u, received over his lifetime subject to an asset evolution equation between 
adjacent periods. If the inter-temporal subjective discount rate, ρ, differs from the 
 4
opportunity cost of funds, r, and if the lending rate equals the borrowing rate, then the 
individual chooses consumption to satisfy the standard Euler equation: 
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where tE denotes the expectations operator conditional on information at time t, and c 
denotes consumption. We have assumed uncertainty over earnings or rate of return.  If the 
discount and interest rates were indeed the same and the expectation in equation 1 was 
realised, then the individual’s consumption would be constant in all time periods and 
equal to the annuity value of permanent income. The same would occur if the marginal 
utility of consumption was linear. Only if permanent income is believed to have changed 
will consumption change. Differences between consumption and income, ty , in specific 
time periods are smoothed away by borrowing and saving. Saving in each period, ts , is 
given by the following equation: 
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(Deaton: 1992) and borrowing occurs whenever saving is negative. This equation says 
that if an individual expects his income to rise in the future he will fund consumption 
today by running down his assets or by seeking credit; if he expects his income to fall he 
will prefer to save.   
 
Several implications follow. First those who expect their income to fall due to retirement 
would prefer to save rather than increase debt.  Since the fall is expected it does not affect 
permanent income and so consumption. Second we assume an individual forms an 
expectation of his life expectancy and as he becomes older we might expect his subjective 
discount rate to increase and so from equation 1 his consumption and possibly his debt 
holding to increase as well. Alternatively if an individual discounts future consumption 
hyperbolically (Liabson: 1997) then his short term subjective discount rate may be even 
higher still resulting in an even greater demand for debt. Third the model assumes zero 
bequests. If an individual wishes to make a bequest at the expected end of his life then he 
will aim to have net assets equal to the amount he wishes to bequest at the expected time 
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of death. According to the model, ceteris paribus, such an individual will hold relatively 
less debt to maximise net wealth at time of death. 
 
Consumption in equation (1) is likely to be a function of various factors affecting 
preferences for example marital status and whether in the labor market. Those aged 50 to 
65 are more likely to have dependent children than those over retirement age with 
consequential greater desired consumption and desire for debt. In additional there are 
particular individual characteristics that are more likely to affect consumption and so debt 
holdings of older people than of younger people.  
 
One example is the occurrence of unexpected health shocks. Thus if an individual who is 
retired suffers an unexpected severe illness and he has health insurance, then his 
permanent income and his consumption and so his demand for debt may be unaltered. If 
he is working it is possible that his permanent income may fall but by less than if he did 
not have health insurance and if he is unable to reduce his consumption in the short term 
he may temporarily fund the excess consumption using short term debt. If the individual 
does not have health insurance and is working then his permanent income may fall and his 
unfunded consumption (e.g. of health care) may increase which may also, in the short 
term, lead to additional debt being borrowed.  
 
The ability to borrow and the household’s demand for debt may depend on whether the 
household already had debt before the onset of a shock. If the household was indebted 
then it may find its demand constrained by lenders or it may not wish to borrow more or 
even to pay some debt back. Alternatively, if the household had no borrowings then a 
health shock may encourage it to take out a loan. 
 
Eligible Americans aged 65 years and over have access to Medicare, a part-US 
government funded health care insurance plan. Medicare will pay for up to four types of 
benefits according to eligibility: hospitalisation care (Part A plan), outpatient care (Part B 
plan), and prescription costs (Part D plan). If a person has paid 40 consecutive months of 
Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes they will receive free hospitalisation care for 
up to 60 days, although there is a $1068 deductible. If a person has paid less than 40 
months of FICA taxes he/she may have to pay up to $423 per month for Medicare 
coverage. Most Americans have free coverage for Plan A if they wish it. All those who 
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have Plan B coverage pay at least $96.40 per month as a premium. An individual may 
choose to be insured for hospitalisation and outpatient care through a private health care 
plan and, if eligible, Medicare will pay up to a fixed premium per month, the individual 
paying the rest (Part C plan). 
 
If a household has medical insurance one might expect their level of debt to be lower than 
otherwise. But the effect may vary according to the household’s state of health. If a 
household’s state of health was poor and it had insurance then one would expect its debt 
to be lower than if the same household’s state of health was poor and the household had 
no insurance.   
 
The effect of the possession of insurance may depend on age. For example Medicare, 
provides medical insurance at a lower price than would be paid for comparable cover by 
those ineligible for such aid. Since only those aged over 65 are eligible for Medicare this 
price effect may cause those who are over 65 and have insurance to be especially well 
covered compared to those aged under 65 who have to pay a higher price for comparable 
insurance cover. In short those who have insurance and who are over 65 may have lower 
debt than those under 65 without access to Medicare. 
 
An older person whose ability to earn labour income should the need arise due to 
unforeseen contingencies may have a nonlinear marginal utility of consumption function 
and so have a precautionary saving motive rather than be willing to take on debt. In effect 
they self-insure against contingencies (see Carroll: 1997). 
 
In addition if income falls due to one of the partners in a household dying the remaining 
partner may reduce mortgage debts possibly by using payouts from life insurance policies 
or by paying off mortgage debt after downsizing the family home. There is some evidence 
to support the sale of the family home following bereavement, though this has not 
specifically considered the effects on mortgage debt, as we do in the paper. For example 
using data from the Retirement History Survey for individuals aged 58 to 73, Venti and 
Wise (1989, 1990) found that home equity was reduced when a household experienced 
retirement or death of a spouse.  Merrill (1984) came to a similar conclusion as did 
Shiener & Weil (1992). Hurd (2002) found larger declines in housing wealth for 
households that suffered the loss of a member than for those that did not. Venti & Wise 
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(2004) also find that housing equity falls slightly for those households that suffer shocks; 
others that move house do not reduce their equity and believe this is consistent with 
households not taking reverse mortgages. However debts held by retirees are not 
measured or specifically considered.  Coile and Milligan (2006) also use the HRS for 
1992 to 2002 to find that asset holdings decline with age and that sales of various assets 
including the principal residence follows death of a spouse. 
 
The basic PIH also omits expenditure on durables such as housing and vehicles. A 
number of authors (Alessie, Devereux and Weber 1997, Brugiavani and Weber 1994) 
have incorporated durables into the PIH which results in an amended Euler equation. An 
individual with housing equity may also choose to withdraw such equity by borrowing 
using his house as collateral. If an individual does not have a bequest motive this may be 
even more attractive since it allows consumption from housing capital to occur. 
 
On the supply side, older people who do not have a bequest motive may be expected to 
have an increasing incentive to default as they become older because there is a 
progressively smaller chance they will wish credit in the future. They may play a finitely 
repeated game with lenders and adopt the optimal strategy of cheating. On the other hand 
evidence suggests that the probability of default declines as an individual becomes older 
and the ECO Act 1974 and Reg B 1976 require that if age is included in a credit scoring 
model then those aged over 62 years must have additional points added to their score. But 
lenders are also aware that older individuals have lower income, ceteris paribus, and so 
would constrain the amount of credit they are willing to grant. But on the other hand older 
individuals, at the age of retirement tend to have larger amounts of financial and physical 
capital than younger people, which can be accepted by lenders a collateral. 
 
The PIH often makes assumptions about consumption, income and debt holdings towards 
the end of a household’s life cycle. These have rarely been examined empirically. In this 
paper we are able to shed light on whether some of these assumptions are indeed valid. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
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We investigate the effects of health shocks on debt holdings by estimating reduced form 
fixed effects regression equations with the following structures. These equations combine 
demand and supply factors which were detailed above. Consider the following static 
equation as an empirical model that explains the level of a specific type of debt held by 
household i in wave t:  
 
ititit
T
itit statehealthdebt ευδβα +++++= xβ 21  ,                      (2) 
 
where ithealth  denotes a measure of the state of health of the respondent and spouse (if 
there is one) for a household, itx   is a vector of demographic (possibly) time varying 
control variables that represent household preferences, tδ denotes wave dummy fixed 
effects and iυ and itε denote random variables. The terms kβ are parameters to be 
estimated.  
 
In the last section we suggested that there may be interactions between age at least 65 and 
having insurance (the price of health care effect) and the state of health and the possession 
of insurance. Including such terms in equation (2) gives 
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where )(ξI  is an indicator function taking on the value 1 if the relational statement ξ  is 
true and iυ  represents household specific effects. Equation (3) nests equation (2) under 
the restrictions 032 == ββ . Equation (3) hypothesises that the state of a household’s 
health in a year affects the volume of debt it holds in that year, for example the debt may 
be lower if the household has health insurance and both the possession of insurance and 
being aged at least 65 years may reduce debt. 
 
We are specifically interested in the effects of health shocks, that is a worsening of a 
household’s state of health. To incorporate these we may first difference equation (2), and 
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argue that instead of first differences in demographics the actual level of the 
demographics affects the change in debt. Allowing the difference in debt to (possibly) be 
a partial rather than a complete adjustment, including the interaction terms just referred to, 
the possibility of the interaction between the occurrence of a health shock and the 
possession of debt in the previous period, and allowing for the level of debt to depend on 
the household’s state of health in the previous period (perhaps due to high health 
expenditures in that period) we gain 
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where iλ  represents household specific effects and itζ  is a random error term. Clearly 
equation (4) nests equation (3) under the restrictions that 0)( 512 ==−= βββγ . 
Equation (4) also nests equation (2) under the restriction that (in equation 4) 
0)( 54312 ====−= βββββγ . We refer to equation (4) as a dynamic panel model due 
to the existence of a lagged dependent variable. 
 
The random variables, iυ  in equation (3) and iλ  in equation (4), can be incorporated as 
either random or fixed effects. However assuming a random effect assumes the validity of 
the strong assumptions that 0),|( =iititE υε z   for all t and 0)|( =itiE zυ , where itz  is 
the vector of regressors and that the regressor moment matrix is of full rank. Instead we 
make less stringent assumptions and regard iυ  as fixed effects so assuming 
0),|( =iititE υε z , full rank of the time-demeaned regressor moment matrix and that 
possibly 0)|( ≠iti zE υ  . 
 
The parameterisations of equation (3) and (4) raise certain issues. In equation (3) we 
assumed that both household income and gross value of houses were strictly exogenous. 
However this may not be so and in our robustness checks for the results for equation (4) 
we instrumented for these variables using variables to be specified later. Secondly, in 
equation (4) the existence of the endogenous lagged dependent variable requires 
consideration to avoid inconsistent parameter estimates that would have resulted from 
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standard first difference LS fixed effects estimators. This results from the correlation 
between )( 21 −− − itit debtdebt  and )( 21 −− − itit ζζ . We estimated equation (4) using Arellano 
and Bond (Arellano and Bond: 1991) one step difference GMM estimators. We have a 
choice of lagged levels or lagged differences in lagged debt to use as instruments for 
1−itdebt  and experimented with various specifications, eventually choosing debt levels 
lagged from period 2 to as far back as was possible in the dataset for each case. 
Consistency of Arellano Bond estimators with these lags assumes that the first difference 
in the error term in equation (4) is not AR(2). We apply an Arellano Bond test for the null 
hypothesis that the first difference in the error term is not AR(2). The validity of the 
instruments also implies that the sample moments computed with the parameters 
estimates should be close to zero. We employ the Hansen (1982) test of the null 
hypothesis that the moment conditions are valid. The interaction term between the 
occurrence of a health shock and the possession of debt in the previous period was 
instrumented using lag 2 values of the variable lagged similarly to those of debt. We 
chose Arellano and Bond first difference GMM estimators rather than Anderson-Hsiao 
(1982) first difference estimators because Arellano Bond estimators are relatively more 
efficient since they use more lags of the instruments than does Anderson-Hsiao. Blundell 
and Bond (1998), using simulation, found that first difference estimators result in 
downwardly biased estimates when the autoregressive parameter (γ ) is above 0.8. 
However as will be demonstrated later our estimates of )(γ  were around 0.45 for 
mortgages and below 0.25 for total debt and consumer loans. 
 
The Data 
 
To investigate these issues we use eight waves of the Health and Retirement Study series 
of surveys. The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) itself first collected data in 1992 
from a sample designed to be representative of all individuals in the US born between 
1931 and 1941 and so aged 50 and over at the time of the survey. The Study of Asset 
Health Dynamics amongst the Oldest Old (AHEAD) first collected data in 1993 and the 
sample was designed to be nationally representative of the population of individuals in the 
US who were born in or before 1923 and so aged 70 and over at the time of the survey. 
The sample was re-interviewed in 1995, 1998 and every two years thereafter. Both 
surveys are multistage area probability samples and over sampled blacks and Hispanics. 
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The two surveys were merged in 1998. The third cohort to be included was the Children 
of the Depression (CODA) survey which collected data in 1998 from a sample that was 
representative of the population of individuals born between 1924 and 1930. Subsequently 
cohorts have been added every six years so that the sample remains representative of 
individuals aged 50 years and over at the time of the addition. Thus the War Babies (WB) 
cohort was added in 1998 and represented the population of individuals born between 
1942 and 1947 and in 2004 the Early Baby Boomers sample was added which was 
representative of individuals born between 1948 and 1953. All cohorts were re-
interviewed every two years and exits and re-entrants the data forms an unbalanced panel. 
 
In this study we use waves 1 to 8 of the HRS3, waves 4 -8 of AHEAD, CODA and WB 
cohorts and waves 7 and 8 of the EBB cohort. We use the Rand imputed values for all 
variables. We omit waves 2A and 3A (1993 and 1995) from AHEAD because debt figures 
were not collected in those surveys. The primary sampling unit of each survey is the 
household financial unit and data is collected for individuals within each unit. The surveys 
track individuals as partnerships split due to divorce, separation or death and so new sub-
households are identified. The assets and wealth values are collected at the level of the 
sub-household rather than at the level of the individual and so we treat the unit of 
observation as the sub-household.  
 
To represent the demographics of a household several options are possible and we chose 
to identify a head of household for each sub household for each year4. For each year 
separately the head of household was identified as follows. If the household consisted of 
one person then that person was the head. If the household consisted of more than one 
person of different genders the male was chosen and if of the same gender the oldest 
person was chosen5. This identification is the same as that employed by the Survey of 
Consumer Finance. An alternative identification might be to take the financial respondent 
(or family respondent) as the head, but then arbitrary changes in which member of the 
household who answered these questions between different years would result in 
                                                 
3 In wave 3 there was a skip error in the questionnaire and the HRS did not ask questions relating to second 
residences that were liven in for less that two months during the year. We have imputed mortgage debt and 
value of second residences for this wave. Details available from the authors on request. 
4 An alternative is to take the mean values of continuous variables like age, but this would be problematic in 
the case of nominal variables like gender and race for example. 
5 The choice of the male is arbitrary and is not to imply any value judgements about the arrangements of any 
individual families. 
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misleading changes in demographic characteristics of the household. Another possibility 
is to take the oldest member of a household. But this may result in individuals who have 
little decision making involvement in the holding of debts being identified. The identified 
head of a household may change over time as partnerships dissolve or one partner dies. 
Notice also that a household is interviewed if at least one member is age-eligible at the 
time the wave was surveyed. That person may be the female in a partnership and yet in 
our identification strategy the male would be chosen as the head and so in our sample the 
age of the head may be below 50 years in some cases.  
 
The surveys collect data separately on three types of debt; mortgages on the primary and 
secondary residences, other loans and home equity loans on the primary residence and 
what we will call ‘consumer debt’ which consists of debt outstanding on credit cards, 
medical debts, debts on life insurance policies and loans from relations. We are unable to 
identify loans on vehicles, non residential real estate, or loans on businesses, or loans on 
various types of financial instruments such as stocks and mutual funds from the 
questionnaires. We present models for total debt, mortgage debt and consumer loans 
separately, models for other loans and home equity lines gave implausible results and so 
are excluded. We model mortgage debt and consumer debt separately because there may 
be constraints for example associated with the requirement for collateral to borrow a 
mortgage which may prevent substitution between these two forms of debt.  
 
We can approximately compare the percentage of households that hold debt in our data in 
2006 with that in the 2007 SCF using figures for the SCF from Bucks et al (2009). For 
both mortgage loans, consumer loans and in total the incidence we observe in our data is 
lower than that in the SCF. For example Bucks et al find that of those where the head is 
aged 65-74, 42.9% hold debt secured on the Primary Residence and 5.0% hold debt 
secured on Other Residential Property (their Table 13). In our data we find that in age 
ranges 65-69 and 70-74 the percentages who have mortgages or other loans or home 
equity loans on their first or second residence are 41.18% and 28.02% respectively. 
However our data excludes those who have a mortgage on non-residential property. 
Nevertheless in our data the incidence is slightly lower. The same indication is given by 
data on the incidence of consumer loans (though our data excludes loans for vehicle 
purchase) and of any type of loan. But of course, the SCF has a much smaller sample than 
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do the HRS surveys for those aged over 50 years and the HRS surveys form a panel 
whereas the SCF does not6. We will exploit the panel property of the data in this paper. 
 
Following Coile and Milligan (2006) we define two measures of a household’s state of 
health in a period. The first is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 in  those periods 
in which either the head of household or his/her spouse (if one exists) reports that they 
had ever been told by a doctor that they suffer from cancer, have had a heart attack or 
heart disease, or a stroke7. This represents a type of illness that we call ‘severe’ in that it is 
life threatening and requires immediate and extensive treatment. The second is a dummy 
variable that takes on the value 1 in those periods in which either the head of the 
household or his/her spouse reports that they have ever suffered from high blood pressure 
or hypertension or chronic lung disease (except asthma) or psychological problems or 
arthritis or diabetes. These conditions, though serious, may be regarded as chronic. A 
severe (chronic) health shock is defined as a change from not ever having suffered a 
severe (chronic) health problem to having had such a problem. Those (very few) 
households that reported a deterioration in their state of health and back again were 
removed because the state of health is defined as ever having suffered from a condition. 
 
The demographic control variables are age, measured as interval linear slope splines with 
one knot at age 65 years, household income, marital status dummies (divorced, widowed, 
single) and employment status dummies (in the labour force, unemployed, retired) and 
gross value of housing assets. Debt, income and value of housing assets were subject to 
inverse hyperbolic sine transformations8.  These covariates have been shown to affect the 
level of debt held in the literature (Crook & Hochguertel 2008, Cox and Jappelli 1993). 
We include wave dummies to account for unexplained heterogeneity specific to the wave. 
All nominal values are deflated to 1992 prices using the CPI. Demographic variables that 
did not change over time such as years of education, gender and race were not included.  
 
                                                 
6 The SCF had a relatively small panel component in 1986 and 1989 only. 
7 An alternative variable on which data is collected is whether an individual has been told by a doctor that 
he/she has had any of these conditions since their last interview. However respondents were allowed to 
dispute the results recorder in a previous interview (albeit within the same wave or in a previous year) and 
then some uncertainty exists for a number of cases as to whether they actually have had the condition or not. 
For this reason we prefer the ‘ever had’ question instead. 
8 )1ln( 2' xxx ++=  
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Debt Holdings and Age 
 
Since we believe our work is the first in-depth analysis of the volume of mortgage and 
consumer debt holdings, specifically of the later years of a household’s consumption 
lifecycle we give some attention to how debt varies with certain demographic 
characteristics. 
 
Table 1 panel a shows descriptive relationships between the percentage of households that 
hold debt and age, conditional and unconditional on state of health defined as ever having 
had a severe health shock. The figures relate to 2006. Surprisingly we see that 22.51% of 
those aged 80-84 years had some form of debt and 9.74% owed money on a mortgage. In 
general the percentage that have any form of debt declines with age for both those with a 
poor state of health and those in better health and the greatest reduction occurs between 
the age ranges of 65-69 and 70-74. When considered for each type of debt separately this 
is true for mortgage debt , but for consumer debt and other debt and home equity lines the 
greatest decline occurs between age ranges 55-59 and 60-64. But the effect of having a 
poor state of health differs between mortgage debt and other loans and home equity lines 
on the one hand and consumer debt on the other. A similar or slightly lower (depending 
on age) proportion of those in poor health has a mortgage than those in better health. But 
the proportion in poor health that have other loans or home equity debt is higher than 
those in better health in age ranges 60 to 74. For consumer loans a higher proportion of 
those in poor health have loans than the proportion of those in good health and this is true 
over all age ranges. 
 
Table 1 panel b shows similar relationships except now we consider if a household has 
had a health shock, that is a deterioration in the state of the respondent’s or spouse’s 
health, in the last two years. In age ranges 60-64, and 70-79 the proportion of those who 
had a shock and who have any type of debt is much higher than the proportion of those 
that did not have a shock. This is generally true of mortgage debt and at ages 55 to 79 for 
consumer debt. For other loans and home equity lines the proportions who have debt are 
roughly the same in both states of health. 
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Table 2 shows the simple relationships between average9 debt holdings and age both 
conditional and unconditional on having debt, and conditional and unconditional on state 
of health. Perhaps surprisingly we see that the average total debt outstanding to those in 
their early 70s is $18.3k and average mortgage debt is $14.5k. Even in their late 70s the 
average US household has $13k debt and $9.8k in mortgage debt. Of course conditional 
on having debt, the average debt was even higher. For those aged 80-84 the conditional 
average debt was $28.6k for those with any debt and an astonishing $53.38K for those 
with mortgage debt, (although the latter were a small proportion of the age group – see 
Table 1 panel a).   
 
The greatest drop in the volume of total debt outstanding also occurs between age ranges 
55-59 and 60-65 for both total and mortgage debt. In contrast the greatest decline in 
consumer debt occurs between early and late 60s, at approximately the age of retirement. 
Within each age range surprising patterns emerge with respect to having poor health.  
Over the age range 55-69 those households where either the respondent or his/her spouse 
have poor health have more total debt than those in better health but at higher ages 
generally the reverse is true. The average value of mortgage debt for those in poor health 
and those in good health is similar at all ages up until age 60-64, thereafter those in poor 
health have a lower mortgage outstanding. However for other and home equity loans for 
all ages above 50 and for consumer loans at all ages above 60 those in poor health have 
more debt outstanding than those in good health.  
 
In Table 2  panel b we see that  there seems to be no  systematic relationship between the 
debt held by those who have had a severe health shock in the last two years and those who 
have not, either for total debt or for each specific type of debt. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show cohort analyses of total debt at each two-year age range. Each line 
in Figure 1 shows the value of total debt for households that were in different age cohorts 
in 1992 and tracks their debt holdings over the next twelve years. Figure 2 shows the 
proportion of households that hold debt. Households that did not supply an interview in 
one year may drop out of the cohort for that year and if they supplied information in a 
later year, re-enter it in that year. The figures clearly show that both the proportion that 
                                                 
9 We do not show median values, even though the distribution of debt holdings is skewed because, as Table 
1a shows, the median in many age groups is zero. 
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hold any form of debt and the average value of debt held decline with age. The figures 
also show the substantial differences between the cohorts. For example if we consider the 
debt holdings of those aged 60-61, we see that those who were aged 56-57 in 1992 have 
much less debt by the time they reach 60-61 years (in 1996) than those who were aged 52-
53 in 1992. This pattern of younger cohorts holding more debt than older cohorts applies 
approximately to all subsequent ages. This suggests that factors, independent of a head of 
household’s age, have lead household debt holdings to increase over time.  
 
Debt Holdings and Health Shocks 
 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating the parameters of equation (3) for total debt, 
mortgage debt and consumer debt. Those households in which the respondent or spouse 
have had severe health problems at sometime in the past hold more debt in total than 
households which have not had such problems, but having had a chronic health problem 
seems to have no effect. Having any form of health insurance seems to increase debt, but 
if the household has ever had a severe shock having insurance reduces debt. Being over 
65 and so eligible for Medicare and having any insurance reduces debt held. This is all 
consistent with households borrowing to pay insurance premiums, but if the households 
have suffered a severe health problem their insurance has paid out most of the health bills 
(the net effect is 0.681-0.579) with a consequent reduced amount of debt outstanding.  
However the effect of poor health seems to impact on holdings of consumer debt rather 
than mortgage debt. In columns 3 and 4 of the table we can see that having had a severe 
health problem at some time has no effect on mortgage debt, but increases the amount of 
consumer debt held. This appears to be reduced if the household also has some insurance 
and being old enough to be eligible for Medicare reduces the amount of both mortgage 
and consumer debt. 
 
Surprisingly being older increased the amount of mortgage debt the average American has 
over the age of 65 years but reduces the amount of consumer debt. Consistent with the 
literature (Venti and Wise 2004), being divorced or widowed and being out of the labour 
force reduces the amount of debt held. 
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Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (4), the dynamic fixed effects model with 
housing real estate and income treated as strictly exogenous. The model for total debt and 
for consumer debt passes the Arellano and Bond test for autoregression in the residuals 
supporting the validity of our instruments and the equation passed the Hansen test for an 
absence of endogenous instruments. The model for mortgage debt passes the 
autocorrelation test but fails the Hansen test and so rejects the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are jointly exogenous. We therefore concentrate on total and consumer debt. 
We now see that the occurrence of a severe health shock in the last two years results on 
average in an increase in the volume of total debt and of consumer debt held. Having debt 
outstanding in the previous period and having a severe health shock over the intervening 
period is associated with a reduction in total debt and in less consumer debt than not 
previously borrowing and a shock, (or no previous debt and no shock or having previous 
debt but no shock). This may indicate a supply effect or more likely a demand effect 
whereby the household repays debt because of uncertainty over life expectancy. The latter 
is more likely since lenders would not automatically find out if a household suffered a 
health shock, unless the borrower began to miss payments.  
 
On the other hand the occurrence of a chronic shock reduces total debt but has no effect 
on consumer debt. Having debt in the previous wave and a chronic shock is associated 
with holding more debt than having no previous debt and a shock, (or no previous debt 
and no shock or having previous debt but no shock). This may indicate a demand effect as 
the household struggles to fund prolonged expenditures to treat chronic illness and repay 
debts outstanding. Table 4 also shows that whether or not a household has had a severe 
health shock sometime in the past has no effect on the total debt it holds which, combined 
with the increase in debt immediately following a severe shock, suggests that the effect of 
a severe shock is relatively short-lived.  On the other hand if a household has ever had a 
chronic health problem any time in the past it will have more debt in the current period, 
this suggesting a possible demand effect. 
  
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is significant for all three aggregations 
of debt with the rank order of the lag coefficients being plausible. We would expect that 
less debt would be repaid between waves from a mortgage loan than from a consumer 
loan. Most of the other  control variables have the expected signs with higher income and 
high values of homes both being associated with having more total debt and a higher 
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value of homes being associated with more mortgage debt, but not more consumer debt. A 
slightly puzzling result is that although higher current household income is associated 
with more total debt being held, it is not associated with the holding of specific types of 
debt. 
 
Robustness Tests 
 
In this section we consider the results if alternative assumptions were adopted. When 
proposing equations (3) and (4) we assumed that observed values of debt were not 
censored, that is that in the population there were no negative values of debt that in the 
data was censored to zero. Since in equilibrium the observed amount of debt equals the ex 
post amounts demanded by and supplied to a household, it is at least conceptually 
possible that both could take on negative values. To consider the possible effects of 
censoring let *itdebt  denote the uncensored volume of debt owed which is observed only if 
0* >itdebt . The observed value of debt, itdebt , is then given by *ititit debtddebt ⋅=  where 
)0)(1 * >= itit debtd . Given these assumptions equation (3) can then be reformulated as 
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Because of censoring, taking first differences to identify directly the parameters on health 
shocks is not plausible so we cannot set up equation (4) to allow for censoring. 
 
To parameterise model (6) assuming that iυ  is a fixed effect (for reasons given earlier) we 
use estimators deduced by Honoré (1992). Because of the censoring, conventional first 
differencing to remove the fixed effects is not possible. Instead it is assumed that two 
observations for the same case, 1iη  and 2iη , are i.i.d conditional on regressor values and 
the fixed effects.  The distribution of itη is assumed homoskedastic for given i , but may 
be heteroskedastic across i .  Given these assumptions Honoré derives an objective 
function from orthogonality conditions for a moment estimator to be consistent and 
asymptotically normal.  
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The results of estimating equation (6) which are shown in Table 5 are qualitatively similar 
to those for equation (3) shown in Table 3. If a household has ever had a severe health 
shock it would on average hold more debt in aggregate and more consumer debt, but not 
more mortgage debt. Whether or not a household has suffered a chronic health problem 
does not appear to affect the amount of debt, of any type, held. Having any form of 
insurance increases the total amount of debt held but having insurance and having had a 
sever shock sometime in the past reduces it. The latter is also true for consumer debt, but 
not for mortgage debt. 
 
Secondly we experimented with alternative specifications of the instrument structure in 
the estimation of equation 4. In our initial specification we assumed that house value and 
household income were exogenous. This may not be true as variables excluded from the 
equation may possibly affect both the error term and either or both of these variables. We 
therefore re-estimated equation (4) instrumenting these variables with their own values 
lagged in periods t-2 and t-3. Since the mortgage equation showed evidence of AR(2) in 
the residuals and invalid overidentifying restrictions we collapsed the instruments for this 
equation alone. That is we used the same instruments for each variable for each time 
period. Both the AR(2) and the Hansen tests were then passed. 
 
The results are shown in Table 6 and again support those given in Table 4. The 
occurrence of a severe health shock over the last two years is associated with an increase 
in total debt and in consumer debt over the two years and from the revised equation for 
mortgages, an increase in mortgage debt also. If the household has a severe shock and any 
health insurance as well, its level of debt would be lower than if it had not had insurance. 
If the household has a severe shock and had debt in the previous period it would have less 
debt afterwards perhaps choosing to repay the debts it had to reduce risk. But if a 
household had no debt and a shock occurred (or no debt and no shock or no shock) it 
would have more debt. So those who have no debt who then face a severe health shock 
appear to take on debt.  
 
If a household has a recent chronic shock it’s net borrowings would decrease, but would 
increase if it had debt in the previous period. Being over 65 and having insurance also 
results in less mortgage debt but has no effect on total or consumer debt. This suggests 
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that being eligible for Medicare reduces debts which might have been incurred if the 
household’s health deteriorated.  
 
Different Types of Insurance Coverage 
 
The HRS allows us to distinguish between different types of health insurance that a family 
may have. We may distinguish between cover provided by a government health care plan, 
a plan provided by a current or former employer of either the respondent or of his/her 
spouse and other insurance provision. In 2006 the Survey shows that 94.8% of households 
had some form of health insurance. Of those that had some form of insurance and where 
we could identify the type they had10, 25.9% had only government insurance and 37.5% 
had only private insurance. Table 7 shows the results of estimating equation (4) with those 
variables indicating whether a household has any insurance replaced by a variable 
indicating whether a household has government only insurance in column two (or private 
only insurance in column three). Each estimated parameter is similar in value to the 
corresponding parameter in Table 4 and the equations for government insurance only 
passed both diagnostic tests.  
 
The results show that cet par households with only government insurance and no private 
insurance have less debt than those with both government and private insurance or private 
insurance only. Those with only government insurance and who have had severe health 
problems sometime in the past have less debt than those who have other types of 
insurance. In contrast, if a household has had chronic poor health and only government 
insurance they actually have more debt than if they had private or both types of insurance. 
When interpreting the equation with private insurance we must be cautious because the 
equation failed the Hansen test of valid instruments. But tentatively it suggests that, cet 
par those with only private insurance have more debt than those with only government 
insurance or both, as do those who also have had severe health problems, although those 
with chronic problems and private only insurance have less debt. The overall conclusions 
of these results are that those who have had severe health problems have less debt if they 
have only government insurance rather than only private insurance or both types, and  
                                                 
10 We could identify whether the housold had only government insurance  in 92.32% of cases, whether irt 
had only private insurance in 91.90% of cases and whether it had any insurance of any kind in 98.92% of 
cases. 
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those who have chronic problems have less debt if they have private insurance and no 
government insurance or both types. But on average, ignoring a household’s state of 
health, those with only private insurance have more debt than do those with only 
government insurance. 
 
These results suggest that if a household has only government health insurance and is 
aged over 65 years and had a severe health shock in the last two years, but no severe 
health problems before that and no debt before that, then on average its debt would be 
$2,88511 higher than if none of these conditions were true. On the other hand if a 
household had only private health insurance, but otherwise has these same characteristics, 
then on average its debt would be $15,6350 higher than if these conditions were true.  
This suggests that if a household where the head is over 65 years of age prefers only one 
type of health insurance, has not had a severe health problem before and it wishes to 
minimise any increase in debt resulting from the occurrence of a severe health shock then 
on average it is more likely to achieve this by having only government insurance rather 
than private insurance. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The PIH and other lifecycle models make assumptions about the consumption behaviour 
of individuals in their later years of life which have implications for the amount of debt 
older people will have. These assumptions have rarely been tested; most previous studies 
consider debt holdings throughout the entire lifecycle. In this paper we have used a large 
panel dataset that was collected specifically from older American households. We have 
found that, as predicted by the PIH, the amount of debt owed decreases with age. 
Preferences, as represented by whether in the labor force and marital status still affect the 
amount of debt owed when a person progresses towards his or her later years of life and 
do so in the same ways as they affect debt earlier in a person’s life. If a household does 
not owe debt, and one of its members suffers a severe health shock then its mortgage debt, 
                                                 
11 Computed as ))(exp(*2/()1)*2(exp( ψψ −  where ψ  is the sum of the coefficients (from Table 7) 
on  has only government health insurance, age65* has only government health insurance, occurrence of a 
severe health shock, ever had severe shock*has only government health insurance) 
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consumer debt and total debt will all  increase regardless of whether it has any insurance 
or not. But if a household has a severe shock and it previously had debt then its total debt, 
mortgage debt and consumer debt will decline. This may be due to lenders asking for 
repayment or, more likely, due to borrowers paying off debt because of a fear of being 
unable to repay if the shock also affects their ability to do so. Households that have 
chronic illness generally have less debt than those who do not, but if the onset of such 
illness occurs then the household will increase the amount it owes. We also found that on 
average if a household prefers to have only one type of health insurance it wishes to 
protect its consumption against a severe health shock they would be better served by using 
government insurance rather than private insurance. 
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Table 1 Percentage Holding of Debt by Age and Health Shock 2006 
Panel a: Whether ever had severe health shock 
_______________________________________________________              ______________________________________________ 
   Total Debt    Mortgage Debt 
 Ever Had Severe Never Had Severe Total Ever Had Severe Never Had Severe Total   
Age Range  Health Shock         Health Shock     Health Shock  Health Shock 
________________________________________________________              _____________________________________________ 
Under 50 79.21   71.99   75.01   59.58   52.83   55.66 
50-54                    73.48 75.66 75.12 53.94   56.05   55.52 
55-59  72.92   73.93   73.62   46.79   53.75   51.58 
60-64  64.13   62.38   63.13   41.81   42.14   42.00 
65-69  57.68   54.98   56.31   36.59   34.96   35.77 
70-74  43.46   48.28   42.97   21.10   22.92   21.84 
75-79  34.56   32.68   33.86   14.80   16.47   15.43 
80-84  23.86   19.84   22.51   9.80   9.61   9.74 
85 and over 13.44 11.96   12.97    4.69   4.64   4.69 
__________________________________________________________________                   ______________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________              ______________________________________________ 
   Other Debt and Home Equity Lines Consumer Debt 
  With Severe  Without Severe  Total   With Severe  Without Severe  Total   
Age Range  Health Shock  Health Shock     Health Shock  Health Shock 
________________________________________________________              _____________________________________________ 
Under 50 16.19    19.46  18.09   52.87   43.92   47.67 
50-54  16.94    14.03  14.76   47.10   44.38   45.06 
55-59  15.97    17.01  16.69   47.39   45.79   46.29 
60-64  13.09    11.25  12.04   37.84   34.62   35.99 
65-69  12.28    10.12  11.19   31.51   29.74   30.61 
70-74  9.36    7.10  8.44 24.98   22.89   24.13 
75-79  5.05    5.72  5.31   21.62   19.93   20.98 
80-84  3.90    3.71  3.83   14.65   11.14   13.47 
85 and over 1.75  1.82  1.77    8.22   6.78   7.7 
__________________________________________________________________                   ______________________________________________________ 
Cases are weighted by household weights. Sample consists of cases where occurrence of severe health shock at any time in the past is not missing. The number 
of cases with a severe health shock, without a severe health shock and in total is the same for the same age range in all four subpanels.  “na” means not avaliable 
due to less than 20 observations. Ref: hrsr\merge\meds5\med1_h 
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Panel b: Whether Has Had Severe Health Shock In Last Two Years 
_______________________________________________________              ______________________________________________ 
   Total Debt    Mortgage Debt 
  With Severe  Without Severe  Total   With Severe  Without Severe  Total   
Age Range  Health Shock         Health Shock     Health Shock  Health Shock 
________________________________________________________              _____________________________________________ 
Under 50 na   70.87   73.98   na   53.98   56.49 
50-54  80.31   74.57   74.86   71.16   54.76   55.59 
55-59  70.19   74.05   73.82   43.55   52.91   52.34 
60-64  77.73   61.62   62.49   45.39   41.56   41.77 
65-69  55.54   56.83   56.75   29.35   36.48   36.07 
70-74  49.12   42.60   43.01                                   24.43   21.88   22.03 
75-79  45.20   32.84   33.71   22.77   14.71   15.27 
80-84  14.72   23.06   22.57   9.99   9.52   9.55 
85 and over 11.24 13.10   12.98    5.73   4.42   4.51 
__________________________________________________________________                   ______________________________________________________ 
 
 
_______________________________________________________              ______________________________________________ 
   Other Debt and Home Equity Lines Consumer Debt 
  With Severe  Without Severe  Total   With Severe  Without Severe  Total   
Age Range  Health Shock  Health Shock     Health Shock  Health Shock 
________________________________________________________              _____________________________________________ 
Under 50 na   13.37   16.14   na   44.65   46.06 
50-54  24.74   14.56   15.08   41.34   44.88   44.71 
55-59  12.40   16.92   16.64   48.58   45.83   46.00 
60-64  18.84   12.11   12.47   37.52   35.04   35.18 
65-69  12.68   11.51   11.58   36.58   30.39   30.75 
70-74  8.90   8.38   8.41                                    28.80   23.81   24.12 
75-79  5.06   5.29   5.27   24.59   20.56   20.84 
80-84  0   4.24   3.99   7.83   14.22   13.84 
85 and over 0 2.02   1.89    5.51   7.95   7.79 
__________________________________________________________________                   ______________________________________________________ 
Cases are weighted by household weights. Sample consists of cases where occurrence of severe health shock in last two years is not missing. The number of 
cases with a severe health shock, without a severe health shock and in total is the same for the same age range in all four subpanels.  “na” means not vailable dues 
to less than 20 observations. Ref: hrsr\merge\meds5\med1_h  
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Table 2 Holdings of Debt by Age and Health Shock 2006  
Panel a: Whether ever had severe health shock  
Total Debt 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Unconditional on Holding Debt     Conditional on Holding Debt 
 Ever Had Severe   Never Had Severe Total         Ever Had Severe Never had Severe Total 
Age Range  Health Shock      Health Shock                     Health Shock  Health Shock 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Under 50 65502.96               81582.69 74848 82700.52 113319 99778.93 
50-54  55381.09  66350.3 63609 75373.4 87690.01 84679.78 
55-59 64308.04 55634.03 58335 88188.11 75249.6 79241.03 
60-64 42629.86 35737.8 38680 66469.43 57290.18 61271.32 
65-69 36984.06 29261.09 33075 64114.04 53223.29 58732.39 
70-74 18169.64 18489.65 18300 41809.66 43748.19 42587.04 
75-79 12315.82 14828.46 13262 35631.51 45369.51 39173.01 
80-84 6677.605 5969.469 6440 27982.87 30087.32 28605.77 
85 and over 2149.522 4799.787 2983 15996.47 40133.7 22994.48 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Mortgage Debt 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Unconditional on Holding Debt     Conditional on Holding Debt   
  Ever Had Severe      Never Had Severe Total              Ever Had Severe Never Had Severe    Total 
Age Range  Health Shock         Health Shock    Health Shock  Health Shock 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Under 50  56663.23 72145 65660.92 95102.29 136568.3 117976.6 
50-54  44736.17 57740.75 54491.34 82932.61 103017.7 98141.95 
55-59  51787.01 44675.31 46890.17 110675.1 83122.85 90907.09 
60-64  31045.67 31138.55 31098.9 74251.31 73888.1 74042.46 
65-69 28676.64 24362.31   26492.89 78367.14 69683.38 74070.73 
70-74 13518.75 15836.75 14463.86 64055.06 69100.13 66213.22 
75-79  8711.10 11548.2 9779.897 58862.41 70120.28 63389.62 
80-84 5193.79 5205.948 5197.876 52989.07 88549.93 53378.15 
85 and over  1642.824 4290.214  2475.396   35090.42 92432.1 53017.22 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Other Loans and Home Equity Lines 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Unconditional on Holding Debt     Conditional on Holding Debt   
  Ever Had Severe       Never Had Severe Total              Ever Had Severe Never Had Severe    Total 
Age Range  Health Shock         Health Shock    Health Shock  Health Shock 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Under 50 3918.93 6187.23 5237.22 24199.48 na 28951.51 
50-54 6092.817 4004.55 4526.34 35966.57 28534.98 30666.16 
55-59 7156.406 4389.586 5251.279   44816.23 25806 31472.02 
60-64 2821.9 2407.117 2584.193 21565.43 21389.52 21471.16 
65-69 6226.516 3180.752 4684.86 50697.92 31432.46 41877.22 
70-74 3223.648 1319.591 2447.31 34427.38 18576.96 28989.54 
75-79 1868.58 1669.706 1793.66 36970.85 29169.29 33800.56 
80-84  892.0792 446.4627 742.4186 22894.94 na 19361.25 
85 and over  311.35   240.2744  288.9984   17781.59 na 16296.11 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Consumer Debt 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Unconditional on Holding Debt     Conditional on Holding Debt   
  Ever Had Severe       Never Had Severe Total              Ever Had Severe Never Had Severe    Total 
Age Range  Health Shock         Health Shock    Health Shock  Health Shock 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Under 50 4920.799 3250.46 3950.032 9308.119 7401.083 8286.917 
50-54 4552.107 4604.997 4591.782 9665.791 10376.11 10190.61 
55-59 5364.623 6569.133 6194.003 11320.56 14345.21 13380.87 
60-64  8762.289 2192.125 4997.01 23154.88 6332.192 13882.58 
65-69 2080.899 1718.029 1897.228 6603.896 5776.851 6197.231 
70-74  1427.236 1333.308 1388.939 5713.02 5825.874 5756.666 
75-79  1736.128 1610.559 1688.823 8029.722 8080.891 8048.031 
80-84  591.7321 317.0578 499.4826 4040.057 2846.429 3708.519 
85 and over  195.347   269.2986  218.604    2376.927 3970.426 2814.555 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Cases are weighted by household weights. Values are in  USD at 1992 prices. Sample consists of cases where occurrence of severe health shock at any time in 
the past is not missing and the respective type of debt holding is not missing. The number of cases with a severe health shock plus those without a severe health 
shock equals the number of cases composing the Total. .  Na denotes fewer than 20 observations. Ref: hrsr\merge\meds5\med2_h  
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Panel b: Whether Had Severe Health Shock In Last Two Years 
Total Debt 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Unconditional on Holding Debt     Conditional on Holding Debt 
 With Severe   Without Severe Total         With Severe Without Severe Total 
Age Range  Health Shock      Health Shock                     Health Shock  Health Shock 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Under 50 na 72918.14 75573.29 na 102891.3 102148.9 
50-54  87128.66  62263.63 63517.85  108491.5 83492.97 84845.66 
55-59 68798.36 58632.74 59256.19 98015.29 79175.01 80273.7 
60-64 44395.67 37929.19 38276.96 57112.86 61550.24 61253.38 
65-69 24767.58 34460.97 33902.02 44597.83 60641.54 59736.27 
70-74 21322.9 18257.62 18449.33 43408.75 42853.76 42893.4 
75-79 12916.8 13244.66 13221.59 28576.36 40326.06 39217.29 
80-84 6204.045 6514.32 6495.88                              na                                        28243.97 28782.94 
85 and over 719.2667 3217.189 3055.318 na 24559.34 23539.7 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Mortgage Debt 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Unconditional on Holding Mortgage Debt   Conditional on Holding Mortgage Debt   
 With Severe       Without Severe Total          With Severe Without Severe    Total 
Age Range  Health Shock       Health Shock  Health Shock Health Shock 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Under 50  na 65213.05 67116.04 na 120808.4 118807.4   
50-54  61921.24 53791.17 54201.26 87020.2 98233.67 97509.6   
55-59  59016.65 47149.31 47877.12 135513.2 89107.15 91475.29   
60-64  33550.45 31109.85 31241.11 73920.82 74846.85 74792.74   
65-69 20563.88 27465.62 27067.65 70063.4 75290.01 75044.77 
70-74 16438.65 14677.6 14787.74 67298.75 67096.94 67110.93 
75-79  10729.95 9533.944 9618.123 47123.4 64831.4 62973.3 
80-84 5600.425 5174.89 5200.18 na 54364.97 54470.38 
85 and over  692.4697 2653.577  2526.493   na 59985.59 56037.62 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
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Other Loans and Home Equity Lines 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Unconditional on Holding Debt     Conditional on Holding Debt   
 With Severe        Without Severe Total            With Severe Without Severe    Total 
Age Range  Health Shock  Health Shock  Health Shock Health Shock 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Under 50 na 4130.749 4614.945 na na na 
50-54 21519.87 3754.16 4650.283 na 25777.27 30843.37 
55-59 5777.051 5136.247 5175.547 na 30359.74 31101.66 
60-64 4973.107 2525.237 2656.88 na 20850.33 21301.31 
65-69 2017.545 5064.41 4888.722 na 43997.7 42224.59 
70-74 3659.35 2132.747 2228.225                            na                                        25457.71 26494.78 
75-79 1133.442 1909.094 1854.5 na 36087.14 35162.77 
80-84  0  832.3756 782.9078 na 19624.41 19624.41 
85 and over  0   328.5913  307.2979   na 16296.11 16296.11 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Consumer Debt 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Unconditional on Holding Debt     Conditional on Holding Debt   
 With Severe        Without Severe Total             With Severe Without Severe    Total 
Age Range  Health Shock   Health Shock  Health Shock Health Shock 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Under 50 na 3574.341 3842.307 na 8005.463 8341.407 
50-54 3687.543 4718.294 4666.302 na 10512.06 10437.78 
55-59 4004.663 6347.186 6203.523 8242.903 13848.42 13485.35 
60-64  5872.106 4294.102 4378.967 15652.13 12254.01 12448.92 
65-69 2186.155 1930.933 1945.649 5975.668 6353.472 6327.55 
70-74  1224.895 1447.272 1433.364 4252.994 6078.493 5942.176 
75-79  1053.416 1801.623 1748.962 4284.677 8763.866 8391.958 
80-84  603.6201 507.0542 512.793 na 3565.272 3704.52 
85 and over  26.797   235.0206  221.5273   na 2957.03 2843.761 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Cases are weighted by household weights. Values are in  USD at 1992 prices. Sample consists of cases where occurrence of severe health shock in the last two 
years is not missing and the respective type of debt holding is not missing. The number of cases with a severe health shock plus those without a severe health 
shock equals the number of cases composing the Total. . Na denotes fewer than 20 observations. Ref: hrsr\merge\meds5\med2_h 
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Table 3 
 
Value of Debt Holding 
Static Fixed Effects  with Level of Health 
(Coefficients) 
 Total Mortgage  Consumer  
Dep Var IH(total debt) IH(mortgage debt) IH(cons debt) 
 
Age < 65 -0.031 0.502  -0.105*** 
Age 65 plus -0.037 0.082** -0.097** 
Divorced -0.887*** -0.666*** -0.622*** 
Widow -0.548*** -0.358** -0.520*** 
Single -0.517 -0.457  -0.487 
Out of lab force -0.455*** -0.483*** -0.136* 
Unemployed 0.075 -0.130  0.263* 
Retired -0.411*** -0.495*** -0.126** 
Has health insurance 0.515*** 0.453*** 0.177 
Age65 & insurance -0.321*** -0.287*** -0.120** 
Ever had severe h shock 0.681** -0.076  0.804*** 
Ever had chronic h shock 0.154 -0.067  0.346* 
Severe *has insurance -0.579*** 0.057  -0.683*** 
Chronic*has insurance -0.247 -0.210  -0.125 
IH income 0.070*** 0.045*** 0.035** 
IHValue of homes 0.315*** 0.423*** 
 0.013** 
 
Dummy 1994 -0.367*** -0.606*** -0.002 
Dummy 1996 -0.692*** -1.117*** 0.033 
Dummy 1998 -0.840*** -1.344*** -0.022 
Dummy 2000 -0.844*** -1.468*** 0.180 
Dummy 2002 -1.074*** -1.821*** 0.113 
Dummy 2004 -0.973** -2.011*** 0.350 
Dummy 2006 -0.977* -2.205*** 0.506 
Constant 4.583 -2.470  8.759*** 
Rho 0.605 0.681  0.448 
R2 0.195 0.134  0.069 
No of obs 83,485 83,485  83,485 
No groups 20,143 20,143  20,143 
* denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Results for fixed effects regression. Age variables are interval slope 
splines. The debt, income and value of homes variables (x) are ln(sqrt(1+x^2)+x). This transformation is indicated by the 
prefix ‘IH’.Standard errors are robust to clustering by case.  Ref:regsv2.log,  
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Table 4 
 
Value of Debt Holding 
Dynamic Fixed Effects  Models with Health Shocks and Exogenous House Value and 
Income 
(Coefficients) 
 Total Mortgage  Consumer  
Dep Var IH(total debt) IH(mortgage debt) IH(cons debt) 
 
IH debt t-1 0.220*** 0.401*** 0.154***  
Age < 65 -0.056 0.097  -0.123* 
Age 65 plus -0.054 0.149*  -0.116* 
Divorced -1.446*** -1.057** -0.183 
Widow -1.305** -0.871*  -0.140 
Single -0.160 -0.677  -0.084 
Out of lab force -0.109 -0.034  -0.229* 
Unemployed -0.024 -0.191  0.416 
Retired 0.011 -0.144  -0.113 
Has health insurance 1.109* 0.313  0.238 
Age65 & insurance -0.241* -0.358*** 0.006 
Occurrence of severe shock 13.111*** 8.621*** 4.930*** 
Occurrence of chronic shock -12.864*** -0.813  -2.844 
Ever had severe shockt-1 -0.390 -0.997*  0.610* 
Ever had chronic shockt-1 1.906** 0.488  0.390 
Ever severe*has any insurance -0.059 0.581  -0.695* 
Ever chronic*has any insurance -1.262* -0.731** -0.097 
Severe shock*has debtt-1 -25.531*** -28.950*** -13.919*** 
Chronic shock*has debtt-1 26.147*** 8.410** 11.282* 
IH income 0.095*** 0.029  0.042* 
IHValue of homes 0.297** 0.418*** 0.006 
  
Dummy 1996 -0.155 -0.391** 0.178 
Dummy 1998 -0.123 -0.489  0.080 
Dummy 2000 -0.249 -0.995*  0.315 
Dummy 2002 -0.439 -1.429** 0.276 
Dummy 2004 -0.295 -1.670*  0.585 
Dummy 2006 -0.295 -1.996*  0.704 
 
Signif of  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  0.459 0.116  0.676 
Hansen test (chi-square(48)) 0.359 0.000  0.147 
 
No of obs 43,647 43,528  43,764  
No of panels 12,872 12,848  12,882 
* denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Results for fixed effects regression using Arellano and Bond 
one step GMM estimators with following instruments:  lag 2 levels of debt lagged as many periods as possible for 
level of debt; lag 2 levels of change in level of health interacted with lag one level of debt, lagged as many periods 
as possible. Age variables are interval slope splines. The debt, income and value of homes variables (x) are 
ln(sqrt(1+x^2)+x). This transformation is indicated by the prefix ‘IH’. Standard errors are robust to clustering by 
case.  Ref:regsv2_h.log (14,31,65).  
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Table 5 
 
Value of Debt Holding 
Static Tobit Fixed Effects  Models with Level of Health 
(Coefficients) 
` Total Mortgage  Consumer 
Dep Var IH(total debt) IH(mortgage debt) IH(cons debt) 
 
Age < 65 -0.109 0.075  -0.367*** 
Age 65 plus -0.223*** -0.065  -0.429*** 
Divorced -1.040*** -0.733*  -1.451*** 
Widow -0.790*** -1.054**  -
1.256*** 
Single -0.278 -0.527  -1.057 
Out of lab force -0.508** -0.433  -0.534 
Unemployed 0.188 -0.098  0.659** 
Retired -0.526*** -0.865***  -
0.420*** 
Has health insurance 0.743** 0.446  0.351 
Age65 & insurance -0.281*** 0.267*  -0.286* 
Ever had severe h shock 1.190*** -0.138  1.703*** 
Ever had chronic h shock 0.304 -0.116  0.897 
Severe *has insurance -0.950*** 0.116  -1.200*** 
Chronic*has insurance -0.479 -0.424  -0.385 
IH income 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.077* 
IHValue of homes 0.543*** 1.846*** 0.041** 
 
Dummy 1994 -0.326** -0.993*** 0.234 
Dummy 1996 -0.615** -1.980*** 0.636 
Dummy 1998 -0.641 -2.318*** 0.642 
Dummy 2000 -0.549 -2.626*** 1.447 
Dummy 2002 -0.884 -3.685*** 1.338 
Dummy 2004 -0.568 -4.158*** 2.338 
Dummy 2006 -0.447 -4.695*** 2.919 
 
 
No of moment  condns 186,601 186,601 186,601 
No of panels 17280 17280  17280 
* denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Results for fixed effects tobit regression. using Honore’s  least squares 
criterion. Age variables are interval slope splines. The debt, income and value of homes variables (x) are ln(sqrt(1+x^2)+x). 
This transformation is indicated by the prefix ‘IH’.Standard errors are robust to clustering by case.  Ref:regsv2_h.log,  
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Table 6 
 
Value of Debt Holding 
Dynamic Fixed Effects  Models with Health Shocks and Endogenous House Value and 
Income 
(Coefficients) 
 Total Mortgage  Consumer 
Dep Var IH(total debt) IH(mortgage debt) IH(cons debt) 
 
IH debt t-1 0.217*** 0.439*** 0.159*** 
Age < 65 -0.717 0.200  -0.122* 
Age 65 plus -0.052 0.190  -0.107 
Divorced -0.882 -1.628  -0.062 
Widow -0.784* -1.392  -0.029 
Single 0.086 -0.872  -0.048 
Out of lab force 0.080 0.437  -0.107 
Unemployed 0.138 -0.070  0.501* 
Retired 0.093 0.214  -0.043 
Has health insurance 0.781 0.560  0.169 
Age65 & insurance -0.226 -0.459*** 0.012 
Occurrence of severe shock 9.514*** 15.767*** 4.300*** 
Occurrence of chronic shock -9.030*** -3.078  -1.743 
Ever had severe shockt-1 0.050 -1.679  0.674* 
Ever had chronic shockt-1 1.495** 0.654  0.353 
Ever severe*has any insurance -0.299 0.925  -0.712** 
Ever chronic*has any insurance -0.973* -1.321** -0.100 
Severe shock*has debtt-1 -17.884*** -52.807*** -11.641*** 
Chronic shock*has debtt-1 18.601*** 23.245  7.367 
IH income 0.685** 0.544  0.331 
IHValue of homes 0.247*** 0.078  -0.029 
  
Dummy 1996 -0.191 -0.532  0.129 
Dummy 1998 -0.149 -0.723  0.037 
Dummy 2000 -0.198 -1.417  0.330 
Dummy 2002 -0.362 -1.958  0.287 
Dummy 2004 -0.182 -2.343  0.593 
Dummy 2006 -0.185 -2.834  0.691 
 
Signif of  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  0.11 0.956  0.323 
Hansen test (chi-square(68)) 0.061 0.190  0.064 
 
No of obs 43,647 43,528  43,764  
No of panels 12,872 12,848  12,882 
* denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Results for fixed effects regression. using Arellano and Bond one step 
GMM estimators with following instruments for total and consumer debt:  lag 2 levels of debt lagged as many periods as 
possible for level of debt; lag 2 levels of house value for house value and of income for income lagged zero and one period; lag 
2 levels of change in level of health interacted with lag one level of debt, lagged as many periods as possible. Instruments for 
mortgage debt are the same as for total and consumer debt but are collapsed. Age variables are interval slope splines. The debt, 
income and value of homes variables (x) are log(sqrt(1+x^2)+x). This transformation is indicated by the prefix ‘IH’.Standard 
errors are robust to clustering by case.  Ref:regsv2_h.log(15 ,34, 66) 
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Table 7 
 
Health Shocks and Insurance 
Dynamic Fixed Effects  Models with Health Shocks and Exogenous House Value and 
Income 
 (Coefficients) 
  Total Total   
Dep Var IH(total debt) IH(total debt) 
 
IH debt t-1     0.231***  0.185*** 
Age < 65   -0.048  -0.042 
Age 65 plus   -0.030  -0.027 
Divorced   -1.270**  1.149** 
Widow   -0.935*  -0.805* 
Single   0.021  -0.080 
Out of lab force   -0.264  -0.290 
Unemployed   -0.418  -0.358 
Retired   -0.090  -0.111 
Has private only health insurance    3.677*** 
Has govt. only health insurance   -1.822** 
Age65 & private only insurance     -0.137 
Age65 & govt. only insurance   -1.822** 
Occurrence of severe shock   11.966*** 6.655*** 
Occurrence of chronic shock   -11.793** -10.116*** 
Ever had severe shockt-1   -0.011  -0.858*** 
Ever had chronic shockt-1   -0.105  2.834*** 
Ever severe*has private only insurance    2.458*** 
Ever chronic*has private only insurance     -4.995*** 
Ever severe* has govt. only insurance  -1.450***  
Ever chronic*has govt. only insurance  2.941*** 
Severe shock*has debtt-1   -22.518*** -14.393*** 
Chronic shock*has debtt-1   20.517**  23.114*** 
IH income   0.099***  0.096*** 
IHValue of homes   0.298***  0.297*** 
  
Dummy 1996   -0.149  -0.156 
Dummy 1998   -0.183  -0.185 
Dummy 2000  -0.363  -0.374 
Dummy 2002   -0.615  -0.633 
Dummy 2004   -0.472  -0.517 
Dummy 2006   -0.546  -0.595 
Signif of  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)                                 0.487  0.216 
Hansen test (chi-square(48))                                 0.372 0.027 
 
No of obs   40,186 40,619 
No of panels   12,369 12,453 
* denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Results for fixed effects regression using Arellano and Bond 
one step GMM estimators with following instruments:  lag 2 changes in debt lagged as many periods as possible 
for level of debt; lag 2 changes in change in level of health interacted with lag one level of debt, lagged as many 
periods as possible.. Age variables are interval slope splines. The debt, income and value of homes variables (x) 
are ln(sqrt(1+x^2)+x). This transformation is indicated by the prefix ‘IH’. Standard errors are robust to clustering 
by case.  Ref:regsv9_h.log (14, 31) 
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